Research

TRUTH AS NONE AND MANY

Forthcoming in Synthese, final draft

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Truth pluralists say that there are many ways to be true. Aaron Cotnoir (2013a) has suggested a “uniquely pluralist response to the liar”. The basic idea is to maintain that, if a sentence says of itself that it is not true in a certain way, then that sentence is not apt to be true in that way, but is instead apt to be true in a different way. While this is consistent with the basic tenets of truth pluralism, I investigate here whether or not it is amenable to any actual pluralist theory. The primary goal of this paper is to argue that Cotnoir's proposal is amenable to form-based pluralism, rather than domain-based pluralism. In particular, in section 1, I argue that there are several serious obstacles in the way of the domain-based pluralist who wishes to endorse Cotnoir's proposal; in section 2, I show how the form-based pluralist can overcome these difficulties. The secondary goal of the paper is to argue that most, if not all, substantivists about truth should find form-based pluralism independently attractive. As such, the possibility of a form-based pluralist solution to the liar is not merely a technical curiosity, but something in which substantivists about truth have a vested interest.

Sidestepping the Frege-Geach problem
(with Graham Bex-Priestley)

Forthcoming in The Philosophical Quarterly, final draft

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Moral expressivists have been wrestling with the Frege-Geach problem for the best part of a century, with mixed success. Recently, however, so-called "hybrid" expressivists claim to solve the problem "on the cheap", by "offloading" the explanation of the logico-semantic properties of moral sentences onto beliefs that are components of hybrid states they express. We argue that this strategy is undermined by one of hybrid expressivism's own commitment: that the truth of the belief-component is neither necessary nor sufficient for the truth of the hybrid state it composes. In its place, we articulate a new approach to solving the Frege-Geach problem. Instead of explaining head-on what it is for, say, a set of moral sentences to be inconsistent, expressivists should "sidestep" and explain what it is to think that a set of moral sentences is inconsistent. To think so is to think they cannot both be true - a modal notion. Since expressivists have given accounts of such modals, we illustrate how sentences like '"lying is wrong" and "lying is not wrong" are inconsistent" express states of minds that are not only coherent, but - by the hybrid expressivist's lights - cannot be rationally rejected. This generalises to straightforwardly to other logico-semantic properties besides inconsistency. We thus obtain a transcendental solution to the Frege-Geach problem.

Nothing is True

Journal of Philosophy, 120(6): 314-338, final draft

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.This paper motivates and defends alethic nihilism, the theory that nothing is true. I first argue that alethic paradoxes like the Liar and Curry motivate nihilism; I then defend the view from objections. The critical discussion has two primary outcomes. First, a proof of concept. Alethic nihilism strikes many as silly or obviously false, even incoherent. I argue that it is in fact well-motivated and internally coherent. Second, I argue that deflationists about truth ought to be nihilists. Deflationists maintain that the utility of the truth predicate is exhausted by its expressive role, and I argue that the truth predicate can still play this expressive role even if nothing is true. As such, deflationists do not stand to lose anything by accepting nihilism. Since they also stand to gain an elegant solution to the alethic paradoxes, on balance deflationists ought to be nihilists.

Truth Pluralism without domains

Forthcoming in Synthese, early access version

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Truth pluralists say that truth-bearers in different "discourses", "domains", "domains of discourse", or "domains of inquiry" are apt to be true in different ways - for instance, that mathematical discourse or ethical discourse is apt to be true in a different way to ordinary descriptive or scientific discourse. Moreover, the notion of a "domain" is often explicitly employed in formulating pluralist theories of truth .Consequently, the notion of a "domain" is attracting increasing attention, both critical and constructive. I argue that this is a red herring. First, I identify the theoretical role for which pluralists appeal to domains, which is to answer what I call the "individuation Problem": saying what determines the way in which a particular truth-bearer is apt to be true. Second, I argue that pluralists need not appeal to domains for this purpose. I thus conclude that, despite the usual way of glossing the view, there is no role for the notion of a "domain" to play in the pluralist's theory of truth. I argue that this defuses the "Problem of Mixed Atomics" and allows the pluralist to sidestep potentially intractable disputes about the nature of domains.

Radical Parochialism about Reference
(with Robbie Williams)

Noûs, 57(3): 600-617, open access version

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We can use radically different reference-schemes to generate the same truth-conditions for the sentences of a language. In this paper, we do three things. (1) Distinguish two arguments that deploy this observation to derive different conclusions. The first argue that reference is radically indeterminate: there is no fact of the matter what ordinary terms refer to. This threat is taken seriously and most contemporary metasemantic theories come with resources intended to rebut it. The second argues for radical parochialism about reference: it's a reflection of our parochial interests, rather than the nature of the subject matter, that our theorizing about language appeals to reference rather than another relation that generates the same truth-conditions. Rebuttals of the first argument cut no ice against the second, because radical parochialism is compatible with reference being determinate. (2) Argue that radical parochialism, like radical indeterminacy, would be shocking if true. (3) Argue that the case for radical parochialism turns on the explanatory purposes of "reference"-talk: on relatively "thin" conceptions, the argument goes through, and radical parochialism is (shockingly! true; on richer conceptions, the argument can be blocked. We conclude that non-revisionists must endorse, and justify, a relatively rich conception of the explanatory purposes of "reference"-talk.

Fallibility without Facts

Ergo 2021, 8(40): 444-473, open access version

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If, as expressivists maintain, the function of normative thought and talk is not to represent or describe the world, then how can normative judgements be correct or incorrect? In particular, how can I make sense of my own normative fallibility, the possibility that my own normative judgements might be mistaken? In this paper, I construct and defend a substantive but non-representational theory of normative (in)correctness for expressivists. Inspired by Blackburn's (1998: 318) proposal that I make sense of my fallibility in terms of the possibility that my judgements might be unstable through improvement, my account is designed in the first instance to vindicate the expressivist's conception of the nature of normative inquiry. I then defend the proposal from the charge that it leaves insufficient room for my own fallibility, and in particular from Egan's (2007) argument that it implies a "smug" asymmetry between myself and others. Critical to the response is the appeal to indeterminacy in cases of fundamental normative disagreement between reasonable normative outlooks.

Shopping for Truth Pluralism

Synthese 2020, 198(12): 11351-11377, open access version

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Truth pluralists say that the nature of truth varies between domains of discourse: while ordinary descriptive claims or those of the hard sciences might be true in virtue of corresponding to reality, those concepting ethics, mathematics, institutions might be true in some non-representational or "anti-realist" sense. Despite pluralism attracting increasing amounts of attention, the motivations for the view remain underdeveloped. This paper investigates whether pluralism is well-motivated on ontological grounds: that is, on the basis that different discourses are concerned with different kinds of entities. Arguments that draw on six different ontological contrasts are examined: concrete versus abundant entities; mind-independent versus mind-dependent entities; sparse versus merely abundant properties; objective versus projected entities; natural versus non-natural entities; and ontological pluralism. I argue that the additional premises needed to move from such contrasts to truth pluralism are either implausible or unmotivated, often doing little more than to bifurcate the nature of truth when a more theoretically conservative option is available. If there is a compelling motivation for pluralism, I suggest, it's likely to lie elsewhere.

Logic, Logical form and the Disunity of Truth

Analysis 2019, 79(1): 34-43, open access version

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Monists say that the nature of truth is invariant, whichever sentence you consider; pluralists say that the nature of truth varies between different sets of sentences. The orthodoxy is that logic and logical form favour monism: there must be a single property that is preserved in any valid inference; and any truth-functional complex must be true in the same way as its components. The orthodoxy, I argue, is mistaken. Logic and logical form impose only structural constraints on a metaphysics of truth. Monistic theories are not guaranteed to satisfy these constraints, and there is a pluralistic theory that does so.

Truth: Explanation, Success, and Coincidence

Philosophical Studies 2018, 175(5): 1243-1265, open access version

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Inflationists have argued that truth is a causal-explanatory property on the grounds that true belief facilitates practical success: we must postulate truth to explain the practical success of certain actions performed by rational agents. Deflationists, however, have a seductive response. Rather than deny that true belief facilitates practical success, the deflationist maintains that the sole role for truth here is as a device for generalisation. In particular, each individual instance of practical success can be explained only by reference to a relevant instance of a T-schema; the role of truth is just to generalise over these individualised explanations. I present a critical problem for this strategy. Analogues of the deflationist's individualised explanations can be produced by way of explanation of coincidental instances of practical success where the agent merely has the right false beliefs. By deflationary lights, there is no substantive explanatory difference between such coincidental and non-coincidental instances of practical success. But the non-/coincidental distinction just is an explanatory distinction. The deflationist's individualised explanations of non-coincidental instances of practical success must therefore be inadequate. However, I argue that the deflationist's prospects for establishing an explanatory contrast between the cases are, at best, bleak. The inflationist, by contrast, is entitled to the obvious further explanatory premise needed to make sense of the distinction. As such, pending some future deflationary rejoinder, the deflationary construal of the principle that true belief facilitates practical success must be rejected; and with it the deflationary conception of truth.